Using semi-tensor product of matrices, the structures of several kinds of symmetric games are investigated via the linear representation of symmetric group in the structure vector of games as its representation space. First of all, the symmetry, described as the action of symmetric group on payoff functions, is converted into the product of permutation matrices with structure vectors of payoff functions. Using the linear representation of the symmetric group in structure vectors, the algebraic conditions for the ordinary, weighted, renaming and name-irrelevant symmetries are obtained respectively as the invariance under the corresponding linear representations. Secondly, using the linear representations the relationship between symmetric games and potential games is investigated. This part is mainly focused on Boolean games. An alternative proof is given to show that ordinary, renaming and weighted symmetric Boolean games are also potential ones under our framework. The corresponding potential functions are also obtained. Finally, an example is given to show that some other Boolean games could also be potential games.
Introduction
Symmetric game is an important class of games. It has drawn a considerable attention from both game theoretical community and system scientists. There are several reasons for this: First of all, symmetry represents "fair". In real world, a fair game is more realistic and acceptable. That makes many commonly played games symmetric. For instance, Rock-Paper-Scissors, Prisoner's Dilemma, Hawk and Dove, etc. are all symmetric. If more general types of symmetric games are considered, many other games such as Battle of the sexes, Matching Pennies, etc. are also symmetric. Secondly, symmetry can greatly simplify the representation and computation of game related issues [22] . Finally, symmetry may be related with certain other properties. For instance, it is well known that a finite symmetric Boolean game, i.e., a game with a common action set of size 2, is an exact potential game [15] .
The concept of symmetric games was firstly proposed by J. Nash in his famous paper [21] . Lately, it has been developed into several classes of interesting games [1] , [18] , [4] . According to [4] , there are two commonly recog-nized classes of symmetric games: (1) ordinary symmetric game; (2) name-irrelevant symmetric game. The first one is very natural, which means all the payoffs are essentially the same. The second one is firstly proposed by Peleg et al [23] , based on a simple type of strategy permutations of Nash [21] . A new class of symmetric games was proposed in [4] as the renaming symmetric game. (See also [6] ).
From mathematical point of view, a symmetry means invariance under the action of certain group. Roughly speaking, a game is symmetric means its payoff functions are invariant under a permutation group, which is a subgroup of a symmetric group [12] .
Linear representation of a group A in a vector space V is an isomorphism A → GL(V ) [24] . This representation not only makes the group action easily computable but also provides a framework to investigate certain properties of the action. In this paper we reveal for each symmetry of games its linear representation, which is the action of symmetric group or its subgroups on the structure vector of games. The structure vector of a game consists of the structure vectors of its payoff functions.
To construct and to investigate the linear representations of symmetric games the semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices becomes a main tool. STP of matrices is a newly developed matrix product [8] . It is a generalization of conventional matrix product and keeps most properties of conventional matrix product remaining available. It has been successfully used for studying logical (control) systems. We refer to [7] , [19] , [13] , [20] , [25] , [27] , [26] , just to name a few. It has also been used to game theoretic control problems [14] , [9] , [10] , [28] .
Vector space structure of finite games is a key issue in this linear representation approach to symmetric games. A clear picture of vector space structure of finite games was firstly presented in [3] . This vector space structure was then modified and merged into an Euclidean space [11] . In this paper a finite game G with player set |N | = n and strategy set |S i | = k i , i = 1, · · · , n, is simply considered as a point in R s , where s = n n i=1 k i , denoted by V G ∈ R s . Such a set is denoted by G [n;k1,··· ,kn] , which has the same topology and vector space structure as R s , as demonstrated in [11] .
The first purpose of this paper is to deduce the linear representations for each of the aforementioned symmetries of finite games, considering as the action of symmetric group or its proper subgroups in the vector space G [n;k1,··· ,kn] ∼ R s , which consists of the structure vectors of all payoff functions. Then it is proved that a finite game G is certain kind of symmetry, if and only if, its structure vector is invariant under the corresponding linear representation. This presentation gives an easy way to verify whether a finite game G is of this kind of symmetry. Moreover, the matrix form of linear representations provides a framework for investigating the properties of symmetric games and manipulating them. Secondly, the relationship between certain symmetric games and potential games is investigated. We mainly focus on Boolean games. The ordinary and renaming symmetric Boolean games are proved to be potential games and the weighted symmetric Boolean games are proved to be weighted potential games.
Thirdly, a special kind of Boolean games, called the negation-symmetric Boolean game, is defined and investigated. We prove that this kind of Boolean games is also potential. It shows that (generalized) ordinary symmetry is sufficient for a Boolean game to be potential, but it is not necessary.
Finally, for statement ease, we give some notations:
(1) M m×n : the set of m × n real matrices. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 considers the action of symmetric group on games. Subsection 2.1 introduces symmetric group and its matrix expression. Subsection 2.2 reviews the semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices, which is a fundamental tool in this paper. Using STP, Subsection 2.3 expresses the group action on finite game into matrix form. Section 3 provides the linear representation for ordinary symmetry of games. Continued from Section 3, Section 4 introduces the weighted symmetry and renaming symmetry, which are two simple extensions of ordinary symmetry. The name-irrelevant symmetry and its linear representation are discussed in Section 5. Some examples are presented to depict them. The potential game is introduced in Section 6. The verification of potential games and the formula for calculating potential function are also presented. Section 7 shows the relationship between potential games and symmetric games for Boolean games only. It was shown that an ordinary symmetric Boolean game and a renaming symmetric Boolean game are potential game. (These conclusions are well known, but we give an alternative proof.) And a weighted symmetric Boolean game is a weighted potential game. The corresponding potential functions are also obtained respectively. Section 8 introduces the negation-symmetric Boolean game and proved that it is also a potential game. Section 9 is a concluding remark, which shows that all the symmetries discussed in this paper can be characterized by a unified form of linear representations. This characteristic property reveals the relationship among them. The relationship between symmetric games and potential games is also summarized. To streamline the presentation, some proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Action of Symmetric Group on Games

Symmetric Group and Boolean Orthogonal Group
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n}. S n is the set of permutations of elements of N . With the composed permutation as the product of two permutations, S n becomes a group. The elements in S n can be expressed either by a one-one correspondence or a product of cycles. We use a simple example to depict them.
Example 1 Consider S 5 , σ, µ ∈ S 5 can be expressed as The product of σ and µ is defined as
Note that in the above product, the permutation σ is performed first, and then µ is performed. Say, 1
Let G be a group and X = ∅, φ : G × X → X is called a group action of G on X, if φ(e, x) = x, e ∈ G is the identity,
The symmetric group has a natural action on N , that is, σ × i → σ(i).
For each σ ∈ S n , we can construct a Boolean orthogonal matrix, called the structure matrix of σ, as
Define the set of structure matrices of n-th order permutations as
Note that the set of n-th order Boolean orthogonal matrices is a subgroup of the general linear group GL(n, R).
Moreover, it is obvious that there is a one-one correspondence between P n and the set of n-th order Boolean orthogonal matrices. We, therefore, have P n < GL(n, R). Next, define ψ : S n → P n as
then ψ is a group isomorphism. That is, ψ is bijective and
It is easy to see that
(1) P n has a natural group action on ∆ n as
(2) if we identify i ∼ δ i n , then the group action of S n on N is exactly the same as the group action of P n on ∆ n . Precisely,
Semi-tensor Product of Matrices
This subsection is a brief introduction to semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices. We refer to [7] , [8] for details. The STP of matrices is defined as follows:
Definition 2 Let M ∈ M m×n , N ∈ M p×q , and t = lcm{n, p} be the least common multiple of n and p. The STP of M and N is defined as
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
The STP of matrices is a generalization of conventional matrix product, and all the computational properties of the conventional matrix product remain available. Throughout this paper, the default matrix product is STP, so the product of two arbitrary matrices is well defined, and the symbol ⋉ is mostly omitted.
First, we give some basic properties of STP, which will be used in the sequel.
(2) (Distributive Law:)
Proposition 4 Let X ∈ R t be a t dimensional column vector, and M a matrix. Then
Next, we consider the matrix expression of logical relations. Identifying
then a logical variable x ∈ D can be expressed in vector form as
which is called the vector form expression of x
Proposition 5 Given a pseudo-Boolean function f : D n → R, there exists a unique row vector V f ∈ R 2 n , called the structure vector of f , such that (in vector form)
Remark 6 In previous proposition, if D is replaced by D k , k > 2, then the function f is called a pseudo-logical function and the result remains available with an obvious modification that
The basic function of a swap matrix is to swap two vectors.
Proposition 8 Let X ∈ R m and Y ∈ R n be two column vectors. Then
The swap matrix has following decomposition property.
Proposition 9
Definition 10 [17, 8] Assume A ∈ M p×s , B ∈ M q⊗s , the Khatri-Rao product of A, B, denoted by A * B, is defined as
Proposition 11 Assume x ∈ ∆ n , y ∈ ∆ p , z ∈ ∆ q , where y, z are logical functions of x and are expressed in algebraic form as
Then we have
Matrix Expression of Finite Games under Action of S n
A finite game, denoted by a triple G = (N, S, C), consists of three components: (i) the set of players N = {1, 2, · · · , n}; (ii) the profile set S = n i=1 S i , where Assume a game G ∈ G [n;κ] is given. It is obvious that the payoff function c i is a pseudo-logical function. When the strategies x i , i = 1, · · · , n, are expressed into their vector form, the payoff functions can be expressed as
where
is called the STP form of the strategy profile. We can also express it in a (column) vector form as
Denoting
then a matrix Φ can be constructed as
This Φ can convert a profile from its STP form into its vector form.
Proposition 12 Let G ∈ G [n;κ] , x and x are STP form and vector form of its strategy profile respectively. Then
Next, assume σ ∈ S n . A straightforward computation shows that
. . .
The following expression can be proved by using formula (25) and Proposition 11.
Proposition 13 Let σ ∈ S n . Define
Then
Finally, we give an expression for calculation Φ σ −1 (i) . In fact, substituting (24) into (25) and we have (2) . . .
3 Ordinary Symmetry and its Linear Representation
Define the structure vector of G ∈ G [n;κ] as
then the game G is completely determined by V G . In this way, we have a vector space structure (precisely, R nκ n ) for G [n;κ] . We refer to [3] , [11] for the vector structure of finite games.
Hereafter, we adopt the terminologies used in [4] to describe the symmetry of games.
Using (25)- (27), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 15 A game G ∈ G [n;κ] is ordinary symmetric, if and only if, for any σ ∈ S n
Then we have the following result:
Theorem 16 G ∈ G [n;κ] is ordinary symmetric, if and only if,
Proof. According to Proposition 15, it is enough to show that (33) and (32) are equivalent. From (32), we have the following identity
On the other hand, a straightforward computation verifies
Substituting it into (34) gives rise to (33). On the contrary, splitting (33) to each block component V c i , it is easy to obtain (34) which yields (32). This completes the proof of Theorem 16. ✷ Definition 17 [24] A linear representation of a finite group A in a finite vector space V is a homomorphism ψ from the group A into the group of GL(V ).
Now consider the vector space G [n;κ] ∼ R nκ n . That is, each G ∈ G [n;κ] is represented by its structure vector V G . Then we have a linear representation of σ ∈ S n in G [n;κ] as follows:
Proof. We already have (4), that is,
What do we need to prove is
This equation comes from (28) and (29).
✷
Corollary 19 G ∈ G [n;κ] is ordinary symmetric, if and only if, it is invariant with respect to the linear representation ϕ, defined by (36).
We give an example to depict this:
Example 20 Consider G ∈ G [3;3] . Denote
and 
A simple computation shows that (38) implies that 
Generalized Ordinary Symmetric Game
Weighted Symmetric Games
be a set of positive real numbers, called the weights.
(1) G is said to be weighted symmetric with respect to σ ∈ S n and {µ i , i = 1, · · · , n}, if
(2) G is said to be weighted symmetric with respect to {µ i , i = 1, · · · , n} if it is weighted symmetric with respect to each σ ∈ S n and µ i , i = 1, · · · , n.
Remark 22
When µ i = 1, i = 1, · · · , n, the weighted symmetry becomes the classical ordinary symmetry.
Example 23 Consider G ∈ G [2;2] . The payoff bi-matrix is in Table 1 . Table 1 Payoff Bi-matrix Then 3c 1 (1, 1) = 2c 2 (1, 1) = 6 3c 1 (2, 2) = 2c 2 (2, 2) = 12
Hence G is a weighted symmetric game with weights: µ 1 = 3 and µ 2 = 2.
Similar to Proposition 15, we have the following result.
Proposition 24 G ∈ G [n;κ] is weighted symmetric with respect to {µ i | i = 1, · · · , n}, if and only if, for each
where T σ is defined in (28) .
Define a weight matrix Γ as
Corresponding to Theorem 16, Proposition 18, and Corollary 19, we have
is weighted ordinary symmetric with respect to {µ i , i = 1, · · · , n}, if and only if, V G is invariant with respect to this linear representation.
Renaming Symmetric Game
, where
(43) (3) G is renaming symmetric if there exists a renaming r = (r 1 , · · · , r n ) such that G r is ordinary symmetric.
Example 27 Consider the Battle of the Sexes, where Player 1 is husband, Player 2 is wife, F is football and C is concert. The payoff bi-matrix is as in Table 2 Table 2 Payoff Bi-matrix of Battle of the Sexes
It is obvious that this game is not ordinary symmetric. But if we rename the strategies in S 2 as F ∼ 2 and C ∼ 1, i.e., choose r 1 = id and r 2 = M n , then it becomes ordinary symmetric. Hence Battle of the Sexes is renaming symmetric.
Similar to Proposition 15, we can have the following result.
Proposition 28 G ∈ G [n;κ] is renaming symmetric with rename r = (r 1 , · · · , r n ), if and only if, for any σ ∈ S n
and
Proof. Denote the structure vectors of the renaming symmetric game as V
By definition, we have
where Γ r is defined in (46). Hence we have
On the other hand, Using the fact that G r is ordinary symmetric, we have, in light of Proposition 15,
Comparing (47) with (48) 
yields (44)-(45). ✷
The following result is parallel to Theorem 16 with a mimic proof.
Theorem 29 Given a renaming r = (r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r n ), where r i ∈ S κ .
(1) The mapping ϕ r :
is a linear representation. (2) G ∈ G [n;κ] is renaming symmetric, if and only if, there exists a renaming such that V G is invariant with respect to the linear representation ϕ r .
Remark 30 Both weighted symmetry and renaming symmetry are theoretically almost trivial. In fact, any property of ordinary symmetry has its corresponding property for weighted or renaming symmetry with some obvious modifications. But from application point of view, the two generalizations enlarged the region of symmetric games a lot, which tremendously expands the application of symmetric game theory.
Verification of Symmetry
Let S be a finite group and V be a finite dimensional vector space, and ϕ : S → GL(V ) be a linear representation.
In this paper, taking the structure of V G into consideration, the row invariance is considered as a default invariance.
The following proposition comes from the definition of linear representation immediately.
Proposition 31 Let ϕ : S → GL(V ) be a linear representation, and
be a set of generators of S, i.e., S = Ω . Then W ⊂ V is invariant with respect to ϕ, if and only if,
This proposition makes the verification of ordinary (or weighted, or renaming ) symmetry easier. Because according to Corollary 19, Theorem 25 or Theorem 29, instead verifying the invariance with respect to all elements of S n , we need only to verify it for a set of generators.
Next, we recall some standard sets of generators of S n .
Proposition 32 [16] (1) S n is generated by transpositions (switches). That is,
(2) S n is generated by transpositions with 1. That is,
Example 33 Recall Example 20. Since
to check whether a game G is ordinary symmetric, it is enough to check (38), for σ 3 and σ 6 only. A numerical verification shows the same result, as shown in (39), can be obtained. ✷
Name-irrelevant Symmetry and Its Linear Representation
This section considers the strategy permutations. We need some preparations.
Definition 34 Consider S nκ , which can be considered as a set of permutations on grouped (or double-labeled) set
θ ∈ S nκ is called a block permutation if there exists an
According to above definition, it is easy to verify the following
, if and only if, there exist π θ ∈ S n , which is a permutation on
Denote the set of such M θ by M [n;κ] . That is
Let
Then it is easy to verify that M [n;κ] , • is a group.
Let θ ∈ Θ [n;κ] and set
Then it is ready to verify that
Moreover, a straightforward computation shows the following result:
is a group isomorphism.
We use an example to depict this.
Example 37 Consider α = (1, 6, 3, 4, 2, 5) ∈ S 9 , and β = (1, 2, 3)(4, 9, 6, 8)(5, 7) ∈ S 9 . Assume they are acting on
which is a set of blocked elements with n = 3 and κ = 3. Then we discuss the matrix expression
• It is easy to verify that both α, β ∈ Θ [3;3] . Moreover, π α = (1, 2) and π β = (2, 3).
• Their structure matrices are 
It is easy to calculate that γ = (1, 8, 4 , 3, 9, 6)(2, 7, 5).
• Since P α , P β ∈ P [3;3] , we have [3;3] .
It follows that
• We already know that Θ [n;κ] is isomorphic to P [n;κ] .
To check that M [n;κ] is also isomorphic to them, we use formula (59) to calculate D These results coincide with the results in (61).
Definition 38 A normal strategy permutation of G ∈ G [n;κ] is a permutation θ ∈ S nκ , satisfying that for each i there exists j = π(i), such that θ(S i ) = S j , and hence
Note that since θ ∈ S nκ , it is forced that π ∈ S n . To emphasize that π is induced from θ, it is denoted as π θ . Now, it is clear that a normal strategy permutation is a block permutation. That is, θ ∈ Θ [n;κ] .
Definition 39 [21] Consider a G ∈ G [n;κ] , a normal strategy permutation θ ∈ Θ [n;κ] is called a strategy symmetry of game G if
The set of strategy symmetries of G is denoted as Θ(G).
Note that θ| π (i) ∈ S κ , and its structure matrix is denoted as
Using Proposition 13 and the expression (4), a straightforward computation shows that (62) can be expressed as
Summarizing the above argument yields
Proposition 40 Consider a G ∈ G [n;κ] , and a normal strategy permutation θ ∈ Θ [n;κ] . θ is a strategy symmetry of game G, if and only if,
The following proposition is a modification of the corresponding result from [4] .
Proposition 41 Denote the set of strategy symmetries of G by Θ(G). Then
Therefore, Θ(G) is called the strategy symmetric group of G.
Similar to Corollary 19, Theorem 25 and Theorem 29, by taking Propositions 31-32 into consideration, we have the following result:
Theorem 42 Consider a G ∈ G [n;κ] . Assume θ ∈ Θ [n;κ] .
(1)
is a linear representation. (2) θ ∈ Θ [n;κ] is a normal strategy permutation of G, i.e., θ ∈ Θ(G), if and only if, V G is invariant with respect to ϕ n (θ).
Example 43 Given G ∈ G [3;3] and θ = β ∈ Θ [3;3] , where β is as in Example 37. The question is: when θ ∈ Θ(G) ?
First, we calculate T θ as According to Proposition 40, θ ∈ Θ(G), if and only if
It follows that the necessary and sufficient condition is: 
where a, b, c, d, e, f, g are arbitrary real numbers.
Definition 44 [4] π ∈ S n is called a name-irrelevant player symmetry if there exists a strategy symmetry θ such that π = π θ . The set of name-irrelevant player symmetries is denoted by Π(G). That is,
It follows from the definition that Π(G) ⊂ S n is a subgroup.
Definition 45 [23]
G ∈ G [n;κ] is said to be nameirrelevant symmetric, if every player permutation is a name-irrelevant player symmetry, i.e., Π(G) = S n .
The following example gives the same conclusion as in [4] with detailed computation.
Example 46 Matching Pennies has payoff bi-matrix as in Table 3 .
It follows from Table 3 that 
Then,
Using (37), we can calculate that
According to Proposition 40, θ i ∈ Θ(G), if and only if
A straightforward verification shows that
It is obvious that Π(G) = S 2 . Hence, G is of nameirrelevant player symmetry.
Potential Game
Definition 47 Let G = (N, S, C) ∈ G [n;k1,··· ,kn] . G is called a weighted potential game, if there exist a set of weights w i > 0, i = 1, · · · , n, and a function P : S → R, called the potential function, such that
When w i = 1, i = 1, · · · , n, G is called a (exact) potential game.
Denote
Using (73), we define
Then we construct E w (n), ξ w (n), and b w (n) as follows:
where ξ
where V c i is the structure vector of c i , that is
Finally, we build a linear system, called the potential equation, as
Similar to the corresponding result in [9] , we can prove the following result:
Theorem 48 A game G ∈ G [n;k1,··· ,kn] is a weighted potential game with w i > 0, i = 1, · · · , n, if and only if, the equation (78) has solution. Moreover, if a solution exists, then a structure vector of the potential function P is
Remark 49 When w i = 1, i = 1, · · · , n, the results become the corresponding results for pure potential games. In this case, the superscripts w in above formulas are all removed.
Symmetric Boolean Games
Matrix Expression of Symmetric Boolean Games
Assume G ∈ G [n;2] , then G is called a Boolean game, because the strategy sets S i = {0, 1}, i = 1, · · · , n. To investigate the ordinary symmetry of Boolean games, we first give an alternative definition. To this end, we introduce a new concept first.
Definition 50 [4] Consider a finite game G = (N, S, C) ∈ G [n;κ] , and let s ∈ S, the strategy multiplicity vector of s is defined as
Note that if t ∈ S N1 := j∈N1 S j , then #(t) is defined in a similar way. Particularly, #(s −i ) ∈ R n is well defined.
It is easy to verify the following equivalent condition of ordinary symmetry.
Proposition 51 Let G ∈ G [n;κ] be a finite game. G is weighted ordinary symmetric with respect to µ i , i = 1, · · · , n, if and only if,
where x i = y j , and #(x −i ) = #(y −j ).
Remark 52 When µ i = 1, i = 1, · · · , n, (81) becomes a necessary and sufficient condition for ordinary symmetry. It is used as the definition of ordinary symmetry in [4] .
According to (40) with w i = 1, ∀i, we know that a game G ∈ G [n;κ] is ordinary symmetric, if and only if, for any σ ∈ S n we have
Express c i into algebraic form as
According to Proposition 32 (precisely, equation (52), it is enough to check (83) for σ = (1, s) ∈ S n−1 (2 ≤ s ≤ n − 1) on {x j | j = i} will not change c i (x). We, therefore, have
Comparing (83) with (84) yields that
where r = max{κ i , κ s+1 }.
According to Proposition 32, as long as V c i satisfies (82), for any σ ∈ S n and σ(i) = i, we have
Hence, (86) is the necessary and sufficient condition for a single payoff function to be satisfied in a symmetric game.
Next, we consider the condition for cross payoffs, that is, for any two payoff functions in a symmetric game need to be satisfied. Note that for p = q,
(87) Assume x p = x q , then #(x −p ) = #(x −q ). According to Proposition 51, we have
Taking i = 1 for (86) and p = 1 for(88), it is ready to verify the following result:
Theorem 53 G ∈ G [n;κ] is a symmetric game, if and only if,
(ii)
Verification of Symmetric Boolean Games
This subsection considers when a Boolean game is symmetric. Let G ∈ G [n; 2] , and according to (89),
Using formula (15), we can calculate that
The penultimate equality comes from (i) the orthogonality and (ii) the dimension complementary.
Next, we investigate the vector space structure of V To construct this h n , we first set T 2 := I 2 . Then we inductively construct
Then we define
A straightforward computation shows the following:
Proposition 54 Let h n : R 2n → R 2 n be the mapping determined by
2n . In other words, for all x ∈ R 2n that h T n (x) satisfy (89), and vise versa.
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷ Example 55 (1) Constructing H n : Since T 2 = I 2 , we have 
, and so on. Then H 3 = I 2 ⊗ T 3 , H 4 = I 2 ⊗ T 4 , and so on. (2) Constructing Symmetric Boolean Game:
Consider G ∈ G [4;2] , and denote
Using Proposition 54 and equation (90), we have that G is an ordinary symmetric game, if and only if, A, B, B, C, E, F, F, G, B, C, C, D, F, G, G, H] ; A, B, E, F, B, C, F, G, B, C, F, G, C, D, G, H] ; E, B, F, B, F, C, G, B, F, C, G, C, G, D, H] .
(94)
We conclude that G ∈ G [4;2] is an ordinary symmetric game, if and only if,
form a basis of the ordinary symmetric subspace of G [4;2] , and they are: 
Symmetric Game vs Potential Game
Applying (96) to Theorem 48 yields the following result:
Lemma 57 A symmetric game G ∈ S o [n;2] is a potential game, if and only if, for any
has solution ξ, where
Note that since (98) has solution for arbitrary v, equation (98) is equivalent to
Lemma 58 The solution K n of the equation (100) exists.
Proof. See the Appendix B. ✷
Then we have the following conclusion:
Theorem 59 Given a Boolean game G ∈ G [n;2] with V G satisfying (96), i.e., G ∈ S o [n;2] . Then it is a potential game. Moreover, the structure vector of its potential function is
where v ∈ R 2n is the solution of (96).
Example 60 Consider a G ∈ S o [4;2] as described in a general form (95). It is easy to calculate that 
And the H 4 is obtained in Example 55. Using formula (101), we can calculate the structure vector of G as
Note that (102) provides a general formula for the potential function of G ∈ S o [4;2] .
Weighted (Boolean) Games
Proposition 61 Consider a Boolean game G ∈ G [n;κ] . Assume G is weighted symmetric satisfying (40). Then G is a weighted potential game with
Proof. Construct an auxiliary game G µ by setting its payoff functions as
Then (40) implies that G µ is an ordinary symmetric game. According to Theorem 59, G µ is a potential game. Hence there exists a potential function P such that
(103) implies that G is a weighted potential game with
µi , (75) and (77) can be converted to
It follows that (78) becomes
Hence, we have
Corollary 62
The potential function of weighted symmetric Boolean game G ∈ S w [n;2] is determined by its structure vector as
where ξ 1 µ ∈ R 2 n−1 is the first block of the solution of (106).
Finally, to verify whether G ∈ G [n;κ] is weighted symmetric, the above argument leads Theorem 53 to the following modification.
Proposition 63 A game G ∈ G [n;κ] is weighted symmetric with respect to {µ i , i = 1, · · · , n}, if and only if, (89) and the following (108) hold with some
Next, we consider a renaming symmetric game G ∈ S r [n;κ] . If κ = 2, then it is obvious that G is a potential game. Then we try to calculate its potential function. We ask a general question: When a renaming game is a potential game?
Finally, from equation (103) one sees that the potential function of a weighted symmetric game G ∈ S w [n;κ] is the same as its modified game G µ , which is a symmetric game. Hence if G ∈ S w [n;2] , the formula (101) can be used to calculate its potential function. We give an example to depict it.
Example 64 Recall Example 23. Since µ 1 = 3 and µ 2 = 2, its modified form G µ has payoff bi-matrix as in Table  4 . Then V G µ = [6, 12, 18, 12, 6, 18, 12, 12] .
Using formula (102), 
Substituting them into (101) yields
Finally, we have
and then the potential function is
Renaming (Boolean) Games
Consider a renaming symmetric game G ∈ S r [n;κ] . Assume the renamed game G r has structure vectors V r i , i = 1, · · · , n. From the proof of Proposition 28, we know
Definition 65 A game G ∈ G [n;κ] is renaming potential, if there exist a renaming r = (r 1 , · · · , r n ), r i ∈ S κ , i = 1, · · · , n such that the renamed game G r is potential.
Note that r i ∈ S κ changes only the order of the strategies within each S i , so if the renaming game G r satisfies
then G also satisfies (110).
Applying Theorem 48 to G r yields the following:
is renaming potential with renaming r = (r i | i = 1, · · · , n), if and only if,
has solution, where E(n), b(n) and ξ(n) are as in (76) and (77) respectively with w i = 1, i = 1, · · · , n. (2) If (111) has solution, then the structure vector of a potential function is
where ξ 1 is the first block of the solution of (111).
Finally, we consider G ∈ S e [n;2] . From the above argument we know that G r is ordinary symmetric and hence is potential. It follows that G is also potential with the same potential function. In addition to this, the formula (101) can be used to calculate its potential function as follows: First, we construct the potential function for renamed system G r using (101) as
Then we have the potential function with respect to G r as
and using Proposition 4, we have
We give an example to demonstrate it.
Example 67 Recall Example 27. As we mentioned there, using r 1 = id and r 2 = (1, 2), we have a renamed system, which has its payoffs as in Table 5   Table 5 Payoff Bi-matrix of Renamed Battle of the Sexes
. Substituting them into (101) yields
Using formula (114) yields
Hence the potential function of the Battle of the Sexes is
8 Negation-symmetric Boolean Games
In previous sections it was seen that a (ordinary or renaming or weighted) symmetric Boolean game is a potential game (could be weighted one). Carefully verifying Example 46 can show that in general a name-irrelevant symmetric game G ∈ G [n;2] is not necessarily to be a (weighted) potential game. This section shows that a special class of G ∈ G [n;2] , which is not a class of (ordinary or renaming or weighted) symmetric Boolean game, is also potential.
Definition 68 A game G ∈ G [n;2] is called a negationsymmetric Boolean game, if
The following proposition can be used to verify if G is negation-symmetric.
Proposition 69 A game G ∈ G [n;2] is negationsymmetric, if and only if,
Proof. Express (115) into algebraic form, and then use Proposition 4, (116) can easily be obtained. ✷ Example 70 Given a game G ∈ G [2;2] . G is a negationsymmetric game, if and only if, its payoff bi-matrix is as in Table 6 . Table 6 Payoff Bi-matrix
Theorem 71 A negation-symmetric Boolean game is a potential game.
Proof. Using (116), we have
From (117), an algebraic computation shows that
Substituting it into the potential equation (78) with w i = 1 leads to
(We refer the readers to Appendix C for details.)
It follows that
is a solution of the potential equation (78) (with w i = 1 ∀i) . The conclusion follows. ✷ It is easy to figure out that
It follows from (79) that the potential function has the structure vector as
The linear representation of S nκ (or its subgroups) in the structure vector space V G of G is a convenient tool to investigate the properties of symmetric games.
Then the relationship between symmetric games and potential games is investigated. It was shown that G ∈ S o [n;2] and G ∈ S r [n;2] are also potential games. G ∈ S w [n;2] is also a weighted potential game. The formulas for calculating their corresponding potential functions are also presented. In addition to this three kind of Boolean games, a class of G ∈ G [n;2] , called the negationsymmetric Boolean games, is also proved to be potential.
Several problems remain for further investigation: From the definition of T k+1 as in (92), we have
where t 0 = t k+1 = 0 2 k−1 .
Then the s-th column of 
This implies that (125) is true for n = k + 1. Therefore, (125) holds for every n and (123) follows. ✷
Now it is ready to prove Proposition 54.
Proof. Proposition 54 is equivalent to that the column set of H n contains a basis of V 
Taking transpose on both sides and multiplying both sides by x i ∈ ∆ 2 n with ♯(x i , 1) = n − i for i = 1, · · · n and x i with ♯(x i , 1) = 2n−i for i = n+1, · · · , n, then we have a i = 0, i = 1, · · · , 2n. As a result, h i , i = 1, · · · , 2n are linearly independent.
Second, we prove that each h i is a suitable candidate of V We prove it by construction. Set
and R n ∈ M 2 n−1 ×(n−1) is defined recursively as
We prove that the K n defined by (131)-(133) satisfies equation (100). That is, we need to show that
To this end, the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 73 Let r i = Col i (R n ), i = 1, · · · , n − 1, then we have
Proof. We prove it by mathematical induction. It is easy to verify (135) for n = 2. Then we assume that (135) holds for n = k. Denoting r i as the i-th column of R k , we have 
Therefore, (135) holds for n = k + 1 and the Lemma is proved. ✷ Now it is ready to give the proof of Lemma 58.
Proof. Denote the s-th column of Q n and H n by q s and h s respectively. Substituting them into each row-block equations of (134) and taking transpose on both sides, we have the following equalities for i = 2, · · · , n: 
where r s = Col s (R n ), s = 1, · · · , n − 1, 0 2 n−1 , s = 0, n.
If x 1 = x i , then ♯(x −i ) = ♯(x −1 ). According to Lemma 72 and Lemma 73, it is easy to check that both sides of (140) are equal to zero.
If x 1 = x i , without loss of generosity we assume that
, and x i = δ 
From (123), we know that the right-hand side (RHS) of (140) equals to zero except RHS = −1, ♯(x −1 ) = n − s, s ≤ n, RHS = 1, ♯(x −i ) = 2n − s, s > n,
From (135), we know that the left-hand side (LHS) of (140) equals to zero except LHS = 1 if ♯(x −1 ) ≥ n − s + 1 ♯(x −i , 1) < n − s + 1, s ≤ n, ♯(x −i ) ≥ 2n − s, ♯(x −1 , 1) < 2n − s, s > n, 
Hence LHS = RHS.
Then (139) follows and this completes the proof of Lemma 58. ✷
C. The proof (119):
For any i = 2, · · · , n, we have
where B i ∈ B 2 n−1 ×2 n and Γ i ∈ B 2 n ×2 n are the i-th row block of B and Γ respectively. Therefore, (119) follows. ✷
